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This paper studies the implications of a societal aversion to inequality
for the optimal design of a public health care system. Inequality aversion is
introduced by postulating a strictly concave ex post social welfare function.
Illnesses are characterized by three factors: the agent￿ s health with treat-
ment, the agent￿ s health without treatment, and the cost of treatment. It
is shown that the optimal public health care system allocates health care
di⁄erently than would private health insurance; speci￿cally, people who are
relatively unhealthy with and without treatment receive more health care,
and people who are relatively healthy with and without treatment receive
less health care. The aggregate quantity of health care under the optimal
public health care system might be either greater or less than under pri-
vate health care insurance. If the public health care system is optimally
designed, allowing agents to purchase supplementary private health care
insurance cannot raise social welfare and is likely to decrease it.
1. Introduction
Although public health care developed largely in response to concerns over equity,
these concerns are missing from the existing studies of the allocative e⁄ects of
health care programs. The intent of the current paper is to correct this omission,
￿I should like to thank Tom Crossley, Seungjin Han, Jerry Hurley and Robert Nuscheler for
valuable conversations.
1with an emphasis on two issues. First, how does inequality aversion a⁄ect the
structure of a public health care program? Second, does inequality aversion cause
societies to prefer public health care to private health care?
There are several ways in which inequality aversion can be modelled. One is
Tobin￿ s [11] speci￿c egalitarianism, under which society￿ s preference for relatively
equal distributions extends only to particular goods, health care being one exam-
ple. Another is Pauly￿ s [7] health care externality, under which each agent cares
about the other agents￿health as well as his own. The externality approach is in-
teresting because it implements speci￿c egalitarianism without forsaking the tools
of welfare economics, but it can be analytically cumbersome. A third approach￿
the one that is adopted here￿ assumes that each agent cares only about his own
health, and that the policy-maker maximizes a social welfare function that is in-
creasing and strictly concave in the individual utilities. The concavity of the social
welfare function implies inequality aversion.
Concavity has one other important implication. Agents are uncertain about
their own future health, and there are competing concepts of social welfare when-
ever uncertainty is present. This issue has been addressed by Starr [10], Mirrlees
[6], Harris [5] and Hammond [4]. Hammond￿ s discussion is particularly well-suited
to the case at hand. He de￿nes the ex ante social welfare function as a function
WA whose arguments are the agents￿expected utilities, and the ex post social
welfare function as the expected value of some function WP whose arguments are
the agents￿realized utilities. If WA is a weighted sum of the expected utilities, it
is mathematically equivalent to an ex post social welfare function in which WP is
the same weighted sum of the realized utilities. However, the mathematical equiv-
alence between the two functions is lost when WA (or WP) is strictly concave, so
that we are forced to choose between these concepts.
There does not seem to be a compelling reason for choosing one criterion over
the other. Both functions are consistent with non-paternalism. Agents confronted
with an uncertain future are forced to maximize their expected utilities, but they
do so knowing that only one outcome will be realized, and that their utility will
ultimately depend only on that outcome. The issue is simply whether we wish to
measure the welfare of the agents before or after the realization. Although Starr
opts for the latter approach, arguing that ex ante welfare is a ￿normative dead
end,￿other investigators have been more circumspect.
Ex post welfare seems to be an appealing criterion in the present case, when
there is both uncertainty over future health and aversion to inequality. Should
the health care system be designed to allay the agents￿fears of future illness, or
2to ameliorate the e⁄ects of illness once it has occurred? Does inequality aversion
mean that society is averse to unequal prospects or to unequal outcomes? The
￿rst option in each question concerns ex ante welfare, while the second concerns
ex post welfare. I favour the second options, and I suspect that I am not alone.
Studies in welfare economics normally assume utilitarian social welfare func-
tions, so that it is not necessary to choose between the two concepts. The redis-
tributive role of health care, for example, has been carefully analyzed by Boadway,
Leite-Monteiro, Marchand and Pestieau [1, 2] and Petretto [8].1 In each case the
social welfare function is the sum of expected utilities, or equivalently, the expec-
tation of the sum of the realized utilities. The distinction between ex ante and ex
post welfare is not relevant to them.
It will be assumed here that the government maximizes a strictly concave ex
post social welfare function. Agents will be assumed to be ex ante identical but
uncertain about the future state of health. Health is represented by a triplet
whose elements are the state of health without treatment, the state of health with
treatment, and the cost of treatment. A production possibility frontier describes
the combinations of aggregate health care and aggregate consumption that the
economy can produce.
Each health care system is characterized by the kinds of agents that are treated
under that system and the kinds that are not treated. The allocation of resources
under private health care insurance di⁄ers from that under public health care;
speci￿cally, public health care shifts health care away from those who are rela-
tively healthy with and without treatment, and towards those who are relatively
unhealthy with and without treatment. Aggregate health care could be either
greater or smaller under public health care than under private health care. Public
health care is preferred to private health care not because it corrects some mar-
ket failure, but because it has an entirely di⁄erent objective. Private insurance
markets forces individuals to maximize expected (or ex ante) utility while the
government, which need not act until every agent￿ s health status is known, is able
to allocate resources to maximize an ex post welfare function.
There is a laissez-faire argument that a system of private health insurance,
operated in conjunction with the public health care system, must raise welfare:
those who purchase private health insurance are better o⁄, while those who do not
purchase it are una⁄ected. This argument does not hold here. A parallel system
of private health insurance moves the economy towards the allocation that would
occur under a purely private health insurance system, and that system does not
1Their work builds on earlier contributions by Rochet [9] and Cremer and Petieau [3].
3maximize ex post welfare. An attempt to supplement public health care with
private health insurance can have only two outcomes: either no one purchases it,
or ex post welfare falls. The latter outcome can arise because the government is
forced to take the reaction of the private health care system into account when
it designs its own system. This reaction constitutes an additional constraint on
the government￿ s maximization problem. That constraint can be binding, and as
always, the addition of a binding constraint reduces the maximized value.
The government￿ s ￿rst-best policy￿ its policy in the absence of active private
insurers￿ takes a very simple form: the social value of another unit of health
care is equated to the social value of the consumption forgone when this unit is
produced. This policy is also its second-best policy￿ its policy in the presence of
active private insurers￿ if the marginal cost of health care is constant. However,
if the marginal cost of health care is increasing, the second-best policy pushes the
social value of another unit of health care below the social value of the forgone
consumption. This policy reduces the amount of health care provided by the
private insurers, increasing the government￿ s control over health care resources.
2. The Model
An agent is identi￿ed by his type a, where
a ￿ (h0;h1;m)
Here, h0 is the agent￿ s health without medical treatment, h1 is health with treat-
ment, and m is the cost of treatment (measured in units of health care). Each
element of the sample space of agent types, A, satis￿es the conditions
0 ￿ h0 < h1
0 < m
The sample space is assumed to be compact and connected. The utility of each
agent is
U = h + u(c)
where h is health (either h0 or h1) and c is consumption. The function u is
increasing and concave.
Let F(X) be the measure of the agents whose types are contained in X (where
X is any subset of A), and assume that F is di⁄erentiable. The set of all types
4that are not treated is A0 and the set of all types that are treated is A1: By
de￿nition,
F(A0 \ A1) = 0
F(A0 [ A1) = 1 (1)
Health care and consumption goods are produced under constant returns to
scale using some vector of inputs. There is a ￿xed supply of each input. The
e¢ cient allocation of these inputs between the industries gives rise to a produc-
tion possibility frontier that is concave but not necessarily strictly concave. The
frontier is
C + G(M) = 0 G
0 > 0;G
00 ￿ 0














It is assumed that G(M) is negative, so that it is possible to treat all of the agents.
The inputs are owned by the agents, who inelastically o⁄er them for sale. Both
goods are produced by competitive and privately owned ￿rms. Since the ￿rms are
price-takers in both the input and output markets, the total income of the agents
is equal to the market value of the produced goods. Their total income (measured
in consumption goods) is
Y ￿ C + G
0(M)M
Each agent has an equal claim on this income.
3. Private Health Care Insurance
Assume that the agents, prior to learning their own types, are able to contract
with competitive health care insurers. Each insurance policy speci￿es a set of
types for which treatment will be provided. The insurer collects premiums from
5all insurees, and provides treatment by purchasing health care from the health
care producers. Competition among the insurers ensures that the policies will
have the following properties:
￿ No policy will provide health care to a positive measure of types for which
h1 ￿ h0 < u
0(c)G
0(M)m
The cost of treating these types would exceed the additional premiums that
could be collected by including their treatment in a policy.
￿ The set of types for which
h1 ￿ h0 > u
0(c)G
0(M)m (3)
and for which no policy provides coverage is measure zero. If a positive
measure of such types existed, some insurer would be able to earn pro￿ts by
o⁄ering a policy that covered them.
￿ Competition among insurers reduces each insurer￿ s pro￿ts to zero. That is,
the total premiums collected by an insurer are equal to the cost of providing
treatment to its insurees.
The last observation implies that, in equilibrium, every agent bene￿ts from the
purchase of insurance if the set of types satisfying (3) has positive measure. The
total premiums collected by the insurers are equal to G0(M)M: After paying these
premiums, the agents have just enough income to purchase all of the consumption
goods. Since each agent has equal income,
c = C = ￿G(M) (4)
for all agents.
De￿ne the composite function
v(M) ￿ ￿u(￿G(M))
It is increasing and convex, and its ￿rst derivative is the utility of the consumption
forgone when aggregate health care rises by one unit. The sets of untreated and
treated types under private health care insurance are2
A0(M) ￿ fa 2 A : h1 ￿ h0 < v
0(M)mg
2The set of agents for whom h1 ￿ h0 is just equal to v0(M)m has measure zero, so the
placement of these agents has no impact on any aggregate variable. Their placement in A1 is
an arbitrary choice of no consequence.
6A1(M) ￿ fa 2 A : h1 ￿ h0 ￿ v
0(M)mg
Then:
Lemma 1. Assume that G(M) is negative. The equilibrium values of C and M
are unique. M is equal to zero and no insurance is sold if
F(A1(0)) = 0
M is positive and every agent purchases insurance if
F(A1(0)) > 0
M is equal to M (i.e, every type is treated) if and only if
F(A1(M)) = 1
4. The Public Health Care System
Now assume that all health care is provided by the government. It divides the
types into two groups, those that will be treated and those that will not. It
provides treatment by purchasing health care from the health care producers.
Since the producers are competitive (and hence equate price to marginal cost),
the total cost of health care is G0(M)M: The government ￿nances its purchase of
health care by imposing a lump-sum tax on each agent. The collective after-tax
income of the agents is equal to C, which is just enough to enable then to purchase
all of the available consumption goods. Each agent has an equal share of income,
so (4) again holds.
The government designs the health care system to maximize an ex post social














The degree of inequality aversion is measured by ￿ 2 (0;1]. There is no inequality
aversion if ￿ is equal to one, but as ￿ falls toward zero, the degree of inequality
aversion becomes progressively larger. The optimal health care system maximizes
(5) subject to (2) and (4).
A necessary condition for the maximization of W is that the government treat
only the agents for whom the bene￿t￿ the increase in the value of W￿ per unit
7of health care is greatest. Consequently, the sets of untreated and treated agents
take the form3
A0(k;M) ￿ fa 2 A : (h1 ￿ v(M))
￿ ￿ (h0 ￿ v(M))
￿ < kmg
A1(k;M) ￿ fa 2 A : (h1 ￿ v(M))
￿ ￿ (h0 ￿ v(M))
￿ ￿ kmg (6)
Here, k is the government￿ s policy instrument: the government treats only agents
for whom the bene￿t per unit of health care is at least k:
The government￿ s choice of k determines the remaining variables. Speci￿cally,
c and M are determined by conditions (2), (4) and (6). Since (4) shows that c is
determined entirely by M, it is useful to focus on the relationship between k and





Aggregate health care M under any policy k is a ￿xed point of the equation
M = ￿(M;k) (7)
Lemma 2. There is at least one solution to (7) for every non-negative k. If there
is a unique solution for each k, M does not rise as k rises.
There is some uncertainty about the uniqueness of the ￿xed point because an
increase in M reduces consumption, expanding the set of types that qualify for
treatment under any policy k and causing ￿ to rise. Thus, there could be several




< 1 for all M 2 [0;M] (8)
This condition can be interpreted as restricting the density of the agents on the
sample space (so that a decrease in c does not shift many agents into the treatment
group), or as placing a su¢ ciently tight upper bound on G0(M) (so that an increase
in M does not greatly reduce c). It will be assumed henceforth that a unique M
is associated with each k:
Under this uniqueness assumption, M is a continuous non-increasing function
of k, and c is a continuous non-decreasing function of k:
M = f M(k)
3The placement of marginal agents again has no impact on the aggregate variables C, M and
W: Their assignment to the treatment group is arbitrary and without consequence.
8c = e c(k)
The former function can be used to express the treatment groups in terms of k
alone:
e Ai(k) ￿ Ai(k; f M(k)) i = 0;1
The value of k determines the stringency of the government￿ s treatment criteria.





= 1 for all k 2 [0;k]





= 0 for all k ￿ k
The connectedness of A implies that, between these values, e A1(k) contracts as k
rises. It follows that f M(k) is decreasing on the interval (k;k), and that e c(k) is
increasing over the same interval. Now consider the government￿ s optimal policy.
Lemma 3. Let k￿ be the policy that maximizes social welfare, and let ￿(k) be















(h1 + u(e c(k)))
￿￿1 dF
￿
If k < k￿ < k, k￿ satis￿es the condition
k = ￿(k)G
0(f M(k))
The social bene￿t of an additional unit of health care is k (by de￿nition). The
social cost of a unit of health care is ￿G0(M), the social value of the consumption
lost when one more unit of health care is provided. If the social bene￿t is greater
than the social cost, social welfare can be increased by reducing k (i.e, relaxing
the requirements for treatment), which increases aggregate health care. Likewise,
social welfare rises with k if the social cost is greater than the social bene￿t. There
is no small change in k that raises welfare when the social cost and social bene￿t
of additional health care are equal.
4The number k is bounded above by the maximum value of (h1 ￿ h0)=m, which is ￿nite by
the compactness of A:
94.1. Health Care without Inequality Aversion
If the social welfare function does not display inequality aversion (￿ = 1), the
treatment group under the optimal policy is simply
A1 = fa : h1 ￿ h0 ￿ v
0(M)mg
which is also the treatment group under private health care insurance. The al-
location of resources under the optimal public insurance program is exactly the
same as the allocation under private insurance. The only rationale for government
involvement in health care in this model is inequality aversion. If there is not in-
equality aversion, it does not matter whether health care is a public or private
institution.
Suppose that there is no aversion to inequality, and that there is a demand
for private insurance. Would acceding to that demand be welfare improving? It
would, but only because it would signal that the government￿ s current health care
is not optimally designed. Optimally restructuring that program would have the
same impact as introducing private insurance.
4.2. Health Care with Inequality Aversion
Resources are allocated di⁄erently under public and private health care if there
is inequality aversion. Figure 1 shows a cross section of the sample space (m
is ￿xed at an arbitrary value) under the assumption that M is the same under
both private and public care. Under private insurance, an agent is treated if his
type places him above the EU-max locus. Under public insurance, an agent is
treated if his type places him above the W-max locus. Since W-max cuts EU-
max from below, there are types that are treated under private insurance but not
under public insurance.5 These types are contained in the darkly shaded region.
Likewise, there are types that are treated under public insurance but not under
private insurance.
Replacing private insurance with public insurance shifts health care away from
those who have good health, whether they are treated or not, and towards those









The loci do not necessary intersect in every cross section; but since total health care is assumed
to be the same under each regime, they must intersect in some cross sections.
10Figure 1: A cross section of the sample space. Types above EU-max would
be treated under private insurance; types above W-max would be treated under
public insurance.
who have poor health, whether treated or not. If there is inequality aversion,
public insurance exists precisely to engineer this kind of reallocation of health
care resources.
It is di¢ cult to compare the resource allocations implied by these two systems,
but the range of outcomes can be illustrated by two examples. The ￿rst example
assumes that
h1 = m = 1
and that, within the population, h0 is uniformly distributed on the interval [0;1]:
Imagine that some but not all types are treated under private health care insur-
ance. The agents purchase insurance that provides treatment if and only if h0 is






M = 1 ￿ v
0(M) (9)
11The solution to this equation is unique. Now consider public health care. An
agent is treated if and only h0 lies on some interval [0;t]. Social welfare is










0(t) = [1 ￿ v(M(t))]












Let t￿ be the value of t under private health care insurance:
t
￿ ￿ 1 ￿ v
0(M
￿) (10)
Evaluating !0(t) at t￿ gives, after some manipulation,
!
0(t















It follows that the optimal public health care policy sets t above t￿, so that aggre-
gate health care is greater under the public health care system than under private
health insurance.
The di⁄erence between these two systems is, of course, the way in which the
treatment costs are allocated. Equation (10) states that an agent of type (t￿;1;1)
feels that the bene￿t of treatment is just o⁄set by the cost of treatment. A public
health system spreads this cost across all of society. Since an agent of this type has
a lower utility than any other agent,6 spreading the cost of his treatment across
the whole of society raises social welfare. Thus, social welfare rises when the agent
is treated under public health care, but does not change when he is treated under
private health insurance.
The second example assumes that
h0 = 0;m = 1
6An agent with a smaller h0 is treated and therefore healthier; an agent with a larger h0 is
healthier even though he is also untreated.
12and that h1 is uniformly distributed on [0;1]. Under private health care insurance,
every agent purchases insurance that provides treatment if and only if h1 is greater
than v0(M￿), where M￿ is again the solution to (9).7 Under public health care,















































Inspection of this expression shows that the sign of the derivative is not certain. It
is negative if t￿ is near zero and it is positive if t￿ is near one, so that the optimal
public health system plan might treat either more types or fewer types than the
private health care system. Suppose, for example, that the utility function is
u(c) = c
and that the production possibility frontier is
c + ￿M = 1
7As before, the fraction of the types that are treated is 1 ￿ v0(M￿):
13t￿ 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.86
t￿ 0 0.087 0.176 0.271 0.374 0.488 0.616 0.757 0.907 1.0
Table 1: The coverage of private health care insurance and the optimal public
health care system in the second example
Then t￿ is equal to ￿, while the socially optimal value of t (call it t￿) depends upon
both ￿ and ￿: Table 1 shows the relationship between t￿ and t￿ when ￿ is equal
to 0.6. The public health care plan is more extensive than the private health care
plan (as it was in the ￿rst example) if ￿ is smaller than some value near 0.55; but
if ￿ is larger than this value, the private health care plan is less extensive.
As in the ￿rst example, the relationship between t￿ and t￿ depends upon
the welfare e⁄ect of spreading one agent￿ s treatment cost across all of society.
If t￿ is small, an agent of type (1;t￿;1) would be less healthy￿ and have lower
utility￿ than most members of society, even after he has been treated.8 Shifting
his treatment cost to the whole of society raises social welfare. Consequently,
treating agents of this type under the public system raises social welfare, even
though treating them under private insurance has no impact on welfare. The
conclusion is reversed if t￿ is large. An agent of type (1;t￿;1) would then be
healthier than most members of society after he has been treated. Shifting his
costs of treatment to the whole of society reduces social welfare. It follows that
treating an agent of this type under the public system reduces social welfare, while
treating him under private insurance has no impact on social welfare.
It seems that anything goes. The optimal public health care system might
treat everyone who would be treated under private health care, or it might not.
Aggregate health care might be greater under the optimal health care system than
under private health care, or it might not.
5. A System with Both Private and Public Insurance
Assume that there is aversion to inequality (￿ < 1), and imagine that a public
health system is in place and that private health care insurance is allowed. The
private insurers o⁄er policies that cover treatment for types that are not covered
8He would be healthier than every untreated agent but less healthy than every treated agent.
Since t￿ is small, the second group of agents outnumbers the ￿rst group.
14under the public system. The government must recognize the response of the
private insurers when it designs its own system.
The government ￿nances its program by imposing a lump-sum tax on each
agent. If the private insurers are viable (they need not be), each agent will also
choose to purchase private insurance, and each agent will pay the same premium.
Consequently, each agent￿ s consumption is again determined by (4).
The set A is now split into three subsets: the set of untreated agents A0, the
set of agents treated under public insurance A1, and the set of agents treated
under private insurance A2: As before, the government maximizes social welfare
by treating the agents for whom the increase in social welfare per unit of health
care is greatest, so that the set of types treated under its program is again given
by (6). The private insurers will cover all of the remaining types for which the
bene￿t of treatment exceeds the cost:
A2(k;M) ￿ fa 2 AnA1(k;M) : h1 ￿ h0 ￿ v
0(M)mg (11)
All other types are untreated.
Aggregate health care is the sum of the health care provided by the government














An increase in M either expands A1(k;M) or leaves it unchanged, and an increase
in M either increases G0(M) or leaves it unchanged. An expansion of A1 or
an increase in v0(M) tends to shrink A2(k;M), so A2(k;M) either contracts of
remains unchanged as M rises. Thus ￿(M;k) is non-increasing in M:
Aggregate health care M under any policy k is a ￿xed point of the equation
M = ￿(M;k) + ￿(M;k) (13)
A ￿xed point exists, and (8) is a su¢ cient condition for its uniqueness.
Lemma 4. If the ￿xed point of (13) is unique for each k, M is a non-increasing
function of k: Let this function be
M = c M(k)
15The set
b A1(k) ￿ A1(k; c M(k))
either contracts or remains unchanged as k rises, and the set
b A2(k) ￿ A2(k; c M(k))
either expands or remains unchanged as k rises.
Less can be said about the set of all treated types, b A1(k)[ b A2(k). An increase
in k transfers some types from A1 to A2; but some of the types added to A2 were
not previously included in A1 and some of the types dropped from A1 are not
added to A2: Even though aggregate health care c M is non-increasing in k, it is
not certain whether the measure of all treated types rises or falls as k rises.
Lemma 5. Assume that the ￿xed point of (13) is unique for each k, and let M00
be aggregate health care under a private health care system. Then there exists
some k0 ￿ k such that b A2(k) is empty for all k ￿ k0, and some k00 > k such that
b A1(k) is empty for all k ￿ k00: Also,
1. c M(k) = f M(k) for all k ￿ k0 and c M(k) = M00 for all k ￿ k00:
2. c M(k) is decreasing on the interval (k0;k00), and c M(k) > f M(k) on the same
interval.
Figure 2 illustrates these results. The public health care system treats all types
when k ￿ k. The coverage of this system contracts as k rises above k until, when
k reaches k0, private insurers begin to provide supplementary insurance. Further
increases in k result in greater private coverage and reduced public coverage. The
public program disappears at k00, and there is only private coverage at all greater
values of k. At every k greater than k0, aggregate health care is greater under
parallel systems of health care than under public health care alone.
An optimally designed public health care system is characterized by a value of
k that lies somewhere between k and k: Can this value be so low that there would
be no latent demand for private health care? Can it be so high that aggregate
health care is less than it would be under private health care? Yes, it can, as the
examples of section 4.2 have shown.
16Figure 2: Aggregate health care under a public health care system, and under a
combined public and private health care system.
5.1. Welfare Implications
A parallel system of private health insurance reduces welfare:
Assume that both private and public health care are permitted, and
that the private insurers o⁄er some or all of the coverage (k ￿ k0):
Then there is a public health care system under which social welfare
W is higher.
Suppose that both private and public health care are permitted, and that the
government sets k at some k￿ that is greater than k0: Aggregate health care is
then equal to c M(k￿): If private health care is not permitted, there is a smaller
value of k (call it k￿￿) such that f M(k￿￿) is equal to c M(k￿): The only di⁄erence
between the ￿mixed￿equilibrium at k￿ and the purely public equilibrium at k￿￿ is
the manner in which health care is allocated. All of the health care is allocated to
maximize W in the purely public equilibrium, but only a part of the health care
is allocated to this end in the mixed equilibrium. It follows that maximal social
welfare is higher when private health care insurance is not permitted.
This result suggests that the role of private insurance in an inequality-averse
society is extremely limited.
17￿ If the government chooses the optimal value of k, and if that k is no greater
than k0, there is no demand for private health care insurance.
￿ If the government chooses the optimal value of k, and if that k is above
k0, there is a demand for private health care insurance. Acceding to that
demand would necessarily reduce welfare. Aggregate health care would be
greater if private insurance were permitted (and k were not changed), but
it would be both too large and badly allocated.
￿ If the government sets k at a value that is not optimal, there might (or
might not) be a demand for private health care insurance. Acceding to
this demand would always be a worse strategy than simply optimizing the
government program.
If the social welfare function displays an aversion to inequality, the observation
that there is a demand for private insurance does not imply that its introduc-
tion would be welfare improving. If the public program is optimally designed,
introducing private insurance would lower welfare; if the pubic program is not
optimally designed, improving the public program would yield a larger increase
in welfare.
5.2. Second-Best Policy
How would the public health care program adjust to the introduction of private
health care insurance? This question has usually been answered by imagining that
there is an innate di⁄erence in e¢ ciency between the public and private sectors, or
by investigating the manner in which the incentives of doctors and other health
care providers are changed. This section o⁄ers an alternative approach. The
private sector allocates health care in a manner that does not maximize social
welfare. The public sector might be able to in￿ uence the extent of the misallo-
cation by strategically altering its own program. This possibility is described by
the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Assume that both public and private health care is permitted. Let
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Let k￿ be the welfare-maximizing value of the instrument k, and assume that both












if G00 is positive.
If the marginal cost of health care is constant at the optimum, the rule that
characterizes the optimal design of the public program is the same whether there
are private insurers or not. Speci￿cally, the social value of another unit of health
care, k, is equal to the social value of the consumption that must be given up to
obtain that unit of health care, ￿G0(M).9 However, this rule does not characterize
the optimal design of the public program if the marginal cost of health care is
increasing and the private insurers are active.
The reasoning behind this result can be understood by referring once again to
the cross section in Figure 1. If G00 is zero in the neighbourhood of k￿, a small
change in k leaves the position of the EU-max locus unchanged. Every type that
lies above the locus is treated under one of the two programs. The only role of
the instrument k is to divide the types that lie below this locus into two groups,
those who are treated under the public program and those who are untreated. A
decrease in k shifts W-max downward, shifting some types from the untreated
group to the public treatment group. The social value of additional health care
is equal to its social opportunity cost under the optimal policy. Now suppose
that G00 is positive in the neighbourhood of k￿: A decrease in k shifts W-max
downward; but it also shifts EU-max upward, so that some types are moved from
the private treatment group to the untreated group. From the perspective of the
public insurer (which conscientiously maximizes W), the latter shift is welfare
improving: the private insurers allocate resources badly, so social welfare rises
when their program is curtailed. The optimally designed public program exploits
this e⁄ect by pushing k below ￿G0(M):
9The form and interpretation of the rule are the same whether or not private insurers are
allowed. However, the optimal values of k and M di⁄er in these two cases because the functions
that relate ￿ and M to k di⁄er.
196. Conclusions
An economy in which the public health system is designed to mitigate inequality
has been examined. Replacing private health care insurance with this kind of
public system shifts health care away from those who are relatively health with or
without treatment and towards those who are relatively unhealthy with or without
treatment. Aggregate health care can either rise or fall. If such a system is in
place, introducing a parallel system of private insurance cannot raise welfare. If
the insurers are active, their presence must reduce welfare.
An important limitation of these results is that the agents were assumed to be
ex ante identical, and in particular, to have equal claims on output. It is not clear
what impact the introduction of ex ante income disparities would have on the
results. These disparities would create greater inequality across the population,
so that the welfare gain to using health care as a redistributive mechanism rises.
At the same time, income disparities lead to di⁄erent demands for health care, so
that a ￿one size ￿ts all￿public health care system entails welfare losses. The net
e⁄ect on welfare is di¢ cult to predict. However, if there are income disparities, it
might be misleading to draw inferences from a model in which health care is the
only redistributive instrument. One could imagine using the tax system to reduce
the inequalities that arise from ex ante income disparities, and the public health
care system to reduce the disparities that arise from ex post di⁄erences in health
status. The practice of combining ex ante and ex post redistributive instruments
is already familiar to us; for example, a large amount of redistribution occurs
through progressive income taxation, but there is further redistribution towards
those who ￿nd themselves unemployed or disabled.
A. Appendix





An increase in M either contracts A1(M) or leaves it unchanged, so ￿ is non-
increasing in M: By (2) the equilibrium value of M is the ￿xed point of
M = ￿(M)
Since ￿ is non-increasing, the ￿xed point is unique. If F(A1(0)) = 0, ￿(0) = 0
so that the equilibrium values of M and C are 0 and ￿G(0): If F(A1(0)) > 0,
20￿(0) > 0, so the equilibrium value of M must be positive. There are then two
cases. First, if F(A1(M)) < 1, ￿(M) < M, implying that the ￿xed point must
satisfy the condition 0 < M < M: Second, if F(A1(M)) = 1, F(A1(M)) = 1 for
all M 2 [0;M] and hence ￿(M) = M for all M 2 [0;M]: The ￿xed point is then
M. In both of these cases, the equilibrium value of C is ￿G(M) > 0: ￿
Proof of Lemma 2: An increase in k leaves A1(k;M) unchanged or shrinks
it, so ￿ is non-increasing in k: An increase in M leaves A1(k;M) unchanged or
expands it, so ￿ is non-decreasing in M: For each k, M is the ￿xed point of
M = ￿(M;k)
￿(M) is continuous and maps [0;M] into [0;M], so at least one solution exists.
Since ￿ is non-decreasing in M, multiple solutions are possible. If the solution is
unique, an increase in k either leaves the graph of ￿ (against M) unchanged or
shifts it downwards, so that M is unchanged or lower. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3: Social welfare under any k￿ can be expressed as the
di⁄erence between social welfare when the treatment group is ￿xed at e A1(k), and
















Here, J(k￿;k) is the change in social welfare caused by the removal of agents from
the treatment group as k￿ rises above the value k: J(k￿) is positive when k￿ is
greater than k, zero when k￿ is equal to k, and negative when k￿ is smaller than k:
Setting the policy instrument equal to k maximizes social welfare if any deviation
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An arbitrarily small increase in k removes from the treatment group the agents
who are marginal candidates for treatment under the current policy. The charac-
teristic of these agents is that
[h1 ￿ v(f M(k))]
￿ ￿ [h0 ￿ v(f M(k))]
￿ = km
21Since the left-hand side of this equation is the social bene￿t of moving an agent
into the treatment group, integrating over all of the agents moved out of the
treatment group by an arbitrarily small increase in k gives
J














Since f M does not switch signs, a stationary point only occurs when the bracketed
expression is equal to zero. ￿
Proof of Lemma 4: At each M, an increase in k tends to contract A1(k;M):
The types removed from A1(k;M) are not always added to A2(k;M), so A1 [ A2
tends to contract as k rises, causing the graph of ￿ + ￿ to shift downward. Con-
sequently, the ￿xed point c M(k) either falls or remains unchanged. Now consider
A1(k; c M(k)): An increase in k tightens the criteria for treatment under the public
program, so that A1(M;k) tends to contract. This e⁄ect is reinforced by a fall in
c M(k). Any contraction of A1(k; c M(k)) leaves more scope for private insurers, so
that A2(k; c M(k)) tends to rise. There is an additional expansion of A2(k; c M(k))
if G0(c M(k)) falls as k rises. ￿
Proof of Lemma 5: The existence of k0 follows from the observations that
b A2(k) does not expand as k falls, and that b A2(k) = ? (because b A1(k) = A).
Likewise, the existence of k00 follows from the observation that a su¢ ciently tight
standard for public treatment excludes every type. The inequality k00 > k follows
from the observation that k00 is the lowest k at which
F (A1(k;M
00)) = 0
while k is the lowest k at which
F (A1(k;0)) = 0
There is only public health care at every k below k0, so c M(k) = f M(k): There is
only private health care at every k above k00, so c M(k) = M00: The connectedness
of A implies that c M(k) is decreasing over the intermediate range. Every increase
in k shifts the graph of ￿+￿ downward, causing the value of the ￿xed point c M(k)
to decline. ￿
22Proof of Lemma 6: Let c M1(k) and c M2(k) be the aggregate quantities of
health care provided by the public and private insurers respectively. Social welfare
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The ￿rst two terms describe social welfare when the public and private treat-
ment groups are arti￿cially ￿xed at b A1(k) and b A2(k) respectively. The next term
describes the change in welfare induced by changing the public treatment group
from b A1(k) to b A1(k￿), and the last term describes the change in welfare induced by
changing the private treatment group from b A2(k) to b A2(k￿): Since b A1(k￿) shrinks
as k￿ rises, J(k￿;k) is positive (negative) when k￿ is greater than (less than) k:
Since b A2(k￿) expands as k￿ rises, L(k￿;k) is also positive (negative) when k￿ is
greater than (less than) k: (Note that these two terms enter W(k￿;k) with op-
posite signs.) Setting the policy instrument equal to k maximizes social welfare
if any deviation of k￿ from k reduces welfare, which requires W(k￿;k) to have a
stationary point at k:
@W(k￿;k)
@k￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(k;k)
= 0












An arbitrarily small increase in k removes from b A1(k) the agents who are marginal
candidates for treatment under the policy k. The characteristic of these agents is
that
[h1 ￿ v(c M(k))]
￿ ￿ [h0 ￿ v(c M(k))]
￿ = km
Since the left-hand side of this equation is the social bene￿t of moving an agent
into the treatment group, integrating over all of the agents moved out of the
treatment group by an arbitrarily small increase in k gives
J











































Consider the two cases in turn.
Suppose that G00(k) = 0: Inspection of (11) shows that an increase in k causes
b A2(k) to expand only because some of the types removed from b A1(k) are added to
b A2(k): It follows that all of the agents added to b A2(k) have the same characteristic
as the agents deleted from b A1(k):
[h1 ￿ v(c M(k))]
￿ ￿ [h0 ￿ v(c M(k))]
￿ = km (15)
Integrating over all of the agents moved into b A2(k) by an arbitrarily small increase
in k gives
L
0(k) = kc M
0
2(k)
Substituting this expression into (14) shows that the stationary point occurs where
k = ￿(k)G
0(c M(k))
Now suppose that G00 > 0: When k rises by some arbitrarily small amount,
some types are moved from b A1(k) to b A2(k), as before, but others are transferred
from b A0(k) to b A2(k): (The latter transfer occurs because an increase in k reduces
aggregate health care c M(k), which in turn reduces the marginal cost of health
care G0(c M(k)): Inspection of (11) shows that, for any given b A1(k), the reduction
in the marginal cost of health shifts some types into b A2(k):) The types at the
boundary between private and public health care satisfy (15) while the types at
the boundary between private health care and no health care satisfy the condition
h1 ￿ h0 = km
For the latter types,
[h1 ￿ v(c M(k))]
￿ ￿ [h0 ￿ v(c M(k))]
￿ < (h1)
￿ ￿ (h0)
￿ < h1 ￿ h0 = km
24Since L0(k) is the increase in social welfare generated by treating all of the agents
added to b A2(k) when k rises marginally,
L
0(k) < kc M2(k)
Inspection of (14) shows that the condition
k < ￿(k)G
0(c M(k))
characterizes the stationary point. ￿
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